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January, 1955
rive at an honest conclusion that the testimony of the
only evidence that would implicate defendant was un-
worthy of belief, then he certainly had the right to say,
and it was his duty to say, that it was unbelievable and,
in law, was not competent to support a verdict of guilt,
then we must uphold the end of such courageous action by
affirming his judgment.
The case is noteworthy because it modifies the rule which has
obtained in criminal case that the jury is the judge of the credit
to be given to a witness and of the weight to be given to his testi-
mony. Heretofore, the rule has been that the testimony of an ac-
complice must be received with great caution if uncorroborated by
other evidence, but that it can result in conviction if it establishes
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt even though it is not corroborated.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, MUNICIPAL LAW,
ZONING
By J. GLENN DONALDSON of the Denver Bar
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(1) Colo. Contractors Ass'n., Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm.,
128 Colo. 333, 262 P. 2d 266.
Action for declaratory judgment that the Commercial Carrier
Act and the ton-mile tax imposed thereby are inapplicable to heavy
construction contractors, who use their own large trucks for trans-
portation of materials.
The Supreme Court held that they were so exempt-not be-
cause included in the exemption clause of the Act, which they were
not, but simply because they were not within the intended scope of
the Act.
The legislation under examination, The Commercial Carrier
Act of 1935, since amended, is the last of the legislative classifica-
tions of carriers by motor vehicles. It was previously held in
Commission v. Manley,' that the '35 Act is regulatory in charac-
ter, not primarily for the raising of revenue, and goes no further
than to regulate and license the use of the highways when used to
transport freight in furtherance of any commercial enterprise.
In short, Justice Clark pointed out here that the Commercial Car-
rier Act of 1935 under examination, applies to transportation of
property sold or to be sold: that a heavy contractor, when pur-
chasing needed materials and supplies, buys not for resale, but to
incorporate them in the completion of a new integrated structure
wherein they are useless for any other purposes: the procurement
and haulage of required materials is but incidental to the over-all
task of producing the finished product contemplated under the con-
tract.
'99 Colo. 153, 60 P. 2d 913.
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Outside authorities were buttressed by Colorado decisions con-
cerned with the sales and use tax law, particularly Craftsmen,
Painters and Decorators v. Carpenter.
2
(2) People ex rel Dunbar, v. County Court of City and County
of Denver, 128 Colo. 374, 262 P. 2d 555.
This was an original proceeding filed by the Attorney General
to prohibit the -County Court from proceeding in contempt against
state officials who had directed that a mentally defective child be
refused admission to the State Home and Training School.
The Court held that where there was no available bed space
in school, refusal of admission of child was not abuse of discretion.
Hence we see that a commitment from the County Court is not
always a mandatory order, particularly where directed to an in-
stitution concerned with education and training as distinguished
from a custodial institution such as the State Hospital for the in-
sane. The Court looked to legislative intent as expressed in the
statutes for this distinction.
Probably of greater general interest was the conflict involved
between the judicial and executive branches of the government
caused by the Court's citation of three institutional officers for
contempt in refusing the admission. The Court pointed out that
these individuals were not officers of any judicial tribunals nor
parties to this nor any other judicial proceedings, hence a state
officer, under such circumstances, may not be required to answer in
response to a contempt citation.
(3) Bruce, Secretary of State v. Leo; Bruce, Secretary of
State v. Holesworth, Consolidated .... Colo...-.267 P. 2d 1014.
Defendants, one a purveyor of liquor by the drink, the other
by the package, were charged by information with the unlawful
sale of alcoholic liquor to minors. Upon arraignment, both de-
fendants entered separate pleas of nolo contendere to the charges
and the Court thereupon assessed nominal fines, which were paid.
Based upon the foregoing, the Secretary of State took steps
to cancel said licenses based upon the theory that they had been
found guilty of a violation of the liquor law in a court of record.
In this he was enjoined by the court below.
The Attorney General conceded that upon hearing, the State
Licensing Authority could not utilize the plea of nolo contendere as
evidence of such sales nor as conclusive admissions of their guilt
thereof without running counter to People v. Edison.3 He con-
tended, however, that a plea of nolo contendere, followed by sen-
tence results in conviction insofar as the application of statutory
liabilities are concerned.
The Supreme Court granted that there was much authority
elsewhere in support of the Attorney General's position, but pointed
out that under its decision in the Edison Case, supra it was com-
2 111 Colo. 1, 137 P. 2d 414.
3 100 Colo. 574, 69 P. 2d 246.
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mitted to the proposition that the plea of nolo contendere, while
effective for sentence in the case where entered, is not otherwise
or elsewhere conclusive. In short, anything growing out of such
plea, such as a sentence, could not be used as a conviction if the
plea itself is deprived of that classification.
(4) People Ex rel Dunbar, Atty. Gen'l. v. District Court of
the City and County of Denver, _ Colo....-. 268 P. 2d 1098.
This, too, was an original proceeding seeking a writ in the
nature of prohibition against the District Court to prohibit fur-
ther proceedings in a class action instituted by the United Workers
for the Blind in Colorado, Inc., and a taxpayer against the State
Board for the Blind, its Executive Director, State Controller, State
Treasurer, State Auditor and their sureties. The gist of the com-
plaint was that the Board and its Director had negligently con-
ducted the affairs of the Industries for the Blind; had misapplied
and falsely reported funds and covered same by bribery of em-
ployees of Auditor's Office, etc. Damages in considerable monetary
sums were demanded in what the Court termed a "Mother Hubbard
Complaint." Injunctive relief was asked.
The Supreme Court held that one who seeks relief from the
courts for an alleged breach of duty imposed on public officers by
statute, must show that he had exhausted the means available to
him through the executive officials of the state. For example, if
appropriations are not wisely spent, the General Assembly can
remedy the situation as a legislative matter. If the affairs of the
Industries for the Blind are negligently conducted by the Board,
the Director of Public Institutions and Governor are charged with
the duty of remedying the situation. Further, this action was an
attempt to control through judicial process, the power and discre-
tion of officers and agents within the Executive Department in
violation of Art. XII of the State Constitution.
A minor point made may save some attorney future embar-
rassment if noted. That is the observation that the plaintiff cor-
poration, United Workers for the Blind in Colorado, Inc., organ-
ized in 1917 for the purpose of promoting in every feasible way
the industrial, social, educational and economic welfare of the
blind and partially blind people in the state, is not a taxpayer, but
is a non-profit corporation organized for social and altruistic pur-
poses. As such, the Court stated, it is not qualified in a taxpayer's
action such as was here involved.
(5) Colorado State Board of Nurse Examiners v. Hohu,
Colo .....- ,268 P. 2d 401.
This case involves court intervention with arbitrary and un-
lawful action of an administrative agency.
The registered nurse's license of Miss Hohu had been revoked
for little more than the uncorroborated testimony of a doctor that




"If it was held to be the rule that profanity is a ground for
revoking a license, then here could be a serious depletion in the
ranks of all professions."
The Court went on to find that the charges were not supported
by the evidence and that one ground of revocation,-that she pos-
sessed habits rendering her unsafe or unfit to care for the sick,
was not even specified in the charge against her.
One may wonder whether the Court was so incensed over the
kangaroo court proceedings before it, that it made some rulings
which it may later have to retract.
Both the Court below and the Supreme Court ruled, in effect:
(a) That the one who hears, must decide. In other words, in the
case at hand, three of five Board members attended the hearing but
the remaining two members based their decisions on a later read-
ing of the transcript of the proceedings. This method was scorned
as following a "correspondence school pattern" and the proceed-
ing was held to be void and of no effect. The statement "that one
who hears must decide" appeared in the first Morgan case, decided
in 1936 by the U. S. Supreme Court. While in the same opinion
the high court clearly indicated that it didn't mean what it said,
the decision was believed by some to sound the death knell for ad-
ministrative hearings as hearing officers in the first instance were
a virtual necessity in the field of federal administrative pratice.
The Morgan case, three decisions later, brought the law back to
where it had started and today mere review of the records made is
sufficient under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and
held to constitute due process by the federal courts. Review of the
record made by the deciding authority, however, is not sufficient
under Colorado practice.
(b) The Court also ruled:
Under the strict rule concerning certiorari, we are permitted
To determine whether or not the Board abused its discretion. How,
(the Court asks) can we make such determination without consid-
ering the testimony and the facts before the Board, together with
the charges made? Unless we are free to make such determinations
from the recorded testimony and facts, there would be no occasion
for any review of any acts of a Board with statutory powers only.
Does this indicate a policy of free substitution of judgment by
the Court? The generally accepted rule is that while the reviewing
authority should, of course, carefully inspect administrative agency
actions, it should be very cautious in the exercise of this power.
It should not disturb the Board's action unless the evidence clearly
indicates that the Board has acted arbitrarily, without sufficient
evidence or just cause or in bad faith. It should not disturb the
action of the Board merely because it thinks the action is not
what it would have taken if it had heard the case originally.
(6) Centennial Turf Club, Inc., v. Colo. Racing Comm.. ....
Colo ..... 271 P. 2d 1046.
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This was a declaratory judgment action brought by horse
track licensees.
The Court drew a logical distinction between breaks ("odd
pennies on payment to the wagerer up to ten cents") concerning
which the statute is silent as to the beneficiary, and the excess of
underpayments (to wagerers) and overpayments which expressly
accrued to the State.
It held that the licensees, in absence of any express provision
to the contrary, were entitled to retain breakage. The rule of law
recognized was that: "The state can obtain revenue only by means
of taxation and is not allowed to obtain revenue by implication."
(6) Battaglia, et al v. Moore, 128 Colo. 326, 261 P. 2d 1017.
Action in the nature of mandamus to compel the Board to
issue a barber's license to the plaintiff, Moore.
The Barber's Act in its applicable section requires that an ap-
plicant for license shall have "practiced the trade in another state
for a period of at least two (2) years and is possessed of requisite
skill in said trade ... "
Plaintiff, for approximately seven years, performed all the
services customarily performed by barbers, but the situs of his
work was on naval ships and not in "another state". The Board
denied the application on the grounds that plaintiff's experience
was in the wrong place-that is, not "in a geographical area with
a defined civil government".
Both as to the geographical question and that of requisite
skill, the Court observed:
Any legislation purporting to restrict one's right to
follow any lawful, useful calling, business or profession
will be strictly considered in favor of the existence of the
right and against the limitation.
The Court found that the purpose of the requirement was to
assure a minimum of two years actual practical experience and
that the legislature was not concerned with geographical boun-
daries. The Court noted that the Board had issue licenses to those
whose only experience was acquired in foreign countries and con-
cluded that experience under the American flag on board a warship
was at least its equivalent.
The trial court had entered two separate orders prior to entry
of judgment to which this writ of error was directed. It was con-
tended that those prior orders were final judgments and upon the
entry thereof the court lost jurisdiction to proceed further in the
absence of a motion for new trial or other formality within the
provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure. While each of the orders
which were entered prior to the judgment here in question, was in-
consistent with the judgment finally entered, they contained a-
specific provision under which the trial court expressly retained
jurisdiction for further proceedings.
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The Court, relying on Goodwin v. Eller,4 rejected the conten-
tion stating:
The Court having retained jurisdiction had full
power to reconsider any findings previously made and to
reach different conclusions of fact or law as finally ad-
judicated.
MUNICIPAL LAW
(1) Linke v. Board of County Commissioners of Grand
County, .... Colo .....- ,268 P. 2d 416.
In 1946 several school districts created and organized the
"Middle Park Union High School District", conducted an election
under the statutes and authorized the issuance of $125,000 in
bonds to build the school building; $105,000 of these bonds were
outstanding at time of suit.
In 1948, two other school districts in the County, by elections,
were annexed to the Union High School District. The Board of
County Commissioners failed and refused to levy a tax on the
property in the newly annexed districts for purposes of paying
its proportionate share of principal and interest on the bonds pre-
viously issued by the Union High school District.
Plaintiff sought by this action to compel the Board of County
Commissioners to so act, that is, to levy a tax on the newly an-
nexed area to assist in paying off the old bonded indebtedness.
The court below sustained defendants motions to dismiss.
The question raised before the Supreme Court was the con-
stitutionality of a status which sought to make newly-annexed
districts subject to assessment and levy to pay for such prior issued
bonds. Plaintiff contended that the statute was unconstitutional
being in violation of Art. XI, Sec. 7 of the Colorado Constitution,
which provides in substance that no school district can create a
debt for erection of school buildings unless the proposal be sub-
mitted to election and approval by majority vote.
This was a case of first impression in Colorado but after ex-
tended review of authority the Supreme Court held that there was
no constitutional conflict. It pointed out the inequities in permit-
ting the newly annexed districts to enjoy the benefits without con-
tribution, hence it ruled the levy on the newly annexed districts to
pay their proportionate share of the previously issued bonds proper
and in order.
(2) Finney et al v. Estes, ____ Colo ..... , 273 P. 2d 638.
This is a garbage case from Colorado Springs. The City
Charter provides that no franchise shall be granted by the City
except upon the vote of the taxpaying electors: that no exclusive
franchise shall ever be granted. It also provides:
The Council may grant a permit at any time in or
upon any street, alley or public place, provided such per-
'127 Colo. 529, 258 P. 2d 493.
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mit may be revocable by the Council at any time, whether
such right to revoke be expressly reserved in every permit
or not.
An initiated ordinance was adopted which caused the City
to suspend collection of garbage itself and let the collection out in
bids.
Plaintiffs sought, through a declaratory judgment action, to
set aside the contract granted upon the grounds that it constituted
the granting of a franchise and was in violation of City Charter
because no vote of the electorate was obtained.
The high Court held that a franchise is ordinarily accepted
as being applicable to the well known services which are deemed
public utilities. Garbage collection is non-such-it is simply the
carrying out of a governmental function for the preservation of
public health and safety.
The grant by City Council of non-exclusive rights to collect
and dispose of garbage, revocable at any time without penalty,
constitutes a revocable permit and is valid.
(3) Cook et al v. City and County of Denver, 128 Colo. 578.
265 P. 2d 700.
This was a suit by property holders for declaratory judgment
and for injunction restraining the City and the Housing Authority
from building storm sewers as authorized by an ordinance creating
the Valverde Storm sewer District in Denver. The decision is one
on the pleadings and not on the merits.
The complaint alleged that the action of the city in creating
storm sewer district and authorizing construction was arbitrary,
capricious, and illegal: that question of benefit to property holders
was disregarded: that property holders were deprived of property
without due process: that these property holders could not be
benefited by the sewer. The complaint was sufficient to entitle
property owners to injunction against construction of sewer the
Supreme Court ruled, and the court below erred in sustaining
motions to dismiss.
The Court followed Ross v. City and County of Denver,5 where
in a similar proceeding the complaint was held to be good as against
a demurrer under the old code procedure. The rule being that on
motions to dismiss, all of the allegations of the complaint are con-
clusively presumed to be true.
(4) Chamley v. City and County of Denver, ...- Colo ..... , 266
P. 2d 1103.
Plaintiff, Chamley, a publisher of a sports magazine, and
several agents solicited subscriptions on the streets. While the de-
tails are not recited in the opinion by Judge Bradfield-the sales
pitch entailed the use of becoming females under the age of consent,
who concentrated their efforts upon the male of the specie and par-
ticularly those in the armed services. For soliciting upon the
' 89 Colo. 317, 2 P. 2d 241.
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streets without a license and because some of the solicitors were
females under the age of 21, arrests were made under a city
ordinance.
The plaintiff, while contending that the ordinance was uncon-
stitutional, chose the remedy of injunction to restrain enforcement
of the ordinance and try the issue.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court properly dis-
missed the action. The Court pointed out that in an action to re-
strain the enforcement of an ordinance, it is improper for the
Court to pass upon the validity of the ordinance because the com-
plainant has an adequate and complete remedy at law. Further,
all questions of the constitutionality or other invalidity of the
ordinance may be asserted and determined in the pending law
action where plaintiff is on trial.
The Court recognized an exception to this rule, to the effect
that injunction could be resorted to if a party had been previously
tried under the ordinance and had prevailed-then it would be
necessary to protect a party from oppressive and vexatious litiga-
tion. But while Chamley had been arrested and tried before, he
had been the loser, hence the exception did not apply.
(5) McDonald v. City of Glenwood Springs, ...- Colo .-... , 267
P. 2d 111.
This is a suit for injunction and declaratory judgment, but
mere contemplation to construct a public improvement had matured
into a contract to do so in this case. Agreement had been entered
into between the City, the County of Garfield, and the State High-
way Commission, whereunder the County was to pay one-quarter
of the cost of replacing a bridge over the Colorado River to be con-
structed wholly within the City. The City had taken appropriate
steps to constitute the city street and the bridge involved, a part of
Highway 82. While several previous decisions had disapproved
the use of county funds to build bridges within the limits of a
town, the Supreme Court pointed out that at the time of those cases
there was no statutory provision giving the Board of County Com-
missioners power to make agreements with a state highway author-
ity for the construction of state highways. In 1921, the Legisla-
ture supplied this authority. Further, that while the power ex-
pressly conferred was not specifically re-enacted in the 1952 De-
partment of Highways Act, there was no intent shown to divest
the Department of that right. Hence, the Court found an implied
right to so do. In 1953, the Court observed that the legislature
apparently felt such authority to contract with one another was
at least implied, as it expressly confirmed and ratified existing
contracts between governmental units.
(6) Champion v. City of Montrose, 128 Colo. 474, 263 P.
2d 434.
Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgments against defendant,
City of Montrose, under Rule 57(b) to have declared invalid cer-
tain ordinances, all relating to a local streeet improvement district,
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and to restrain future contemplated actions thereunder of defendant
city.
Since the creation of the district, seven years before, extensive
work had been done through the proceeds of a bond issue of $140,000
-all but $1,000 of which had been repaid, and by property assess-
ments.
It was held that the questions presented here are not within
the purview of the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Besides holding that necessary parties to the action were want-
ing, the Court pointed out that the City had been engaged in activi-
ties under those ordinances for seven years and if plaintiffs had,
during this period, considered the ordinances invalid, they could
have invoked injunction proceedings to enjoin enforcement.
With showing of Colorado precedent, it also ruled that future
contemplated acts of the city present no grounds for declaratory
judgment action.
ZONING
(1) DiSatle v. Giggal, 128 Colo. 208, 261 P. 2d 499.
This was an action for injunction to restrain building opera-
tions in a zoned district.
The tract in question was zoned in 1941 by the County Com-
missioners of Arapahoe County. By such zoning the use of the
tract was restricted to five family units. Without building permit,
defendant in 1945 commenced construction of nine family units.
When the buildings were approximately two-thirds completed the
County Zoning authorities halted construction. The defendant
thereupon applied for building permits for the work undertaken,
promising to reduce the units to five when the war emergency
housing situation was over. In 1949, the emergency being over,
demand was made for conformance, but was refused.
The important contention advanced by defendant was that the
restrictions in the zoning resolution limiting density of population
are void. The Court held upon the authority of Colby v. Board of
Adjustment of Denver,' that such limitations, when reasonably
applied, are in the proper exercise of the police power. In the in-
stant case, the Court ruled that the regulation of the number of
families to a given lot area is of vital importance to the orderly
development of a rapidly growing territory adjoining a city, partic-
ularly for reasons of sanitation thereof.
The further defenses of laches, estoppel and the one year
statute of limitations were rejected under the circumstances pres-
ent.
(2) Bohn v. Board of Adjustment of the City and County of
Denver- Colo .-.... 271 P. 2d 1051.
Relator applied to the Chief Building Inspector for a permit
to construct an addition to his existing motel on eight lots owned by
6 81 Colo. 344, 255 P. 443.
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him since 1922. The lots were located on Wolff Street just off
West Colfax Avenue in Denver. They were zoned Residence "B".
Relator failed of permission before the Inspector, Board of Ad-
justment and District Court.
The sole question prosecuted to the Supreme Court was whether
the evidence entitled relator to the relief demanded. No protests
or objections to the petition had been made. The Court found noth-
ing in the return of respondents which even remotely suggested
that the contemplated use of relator's property would be injurious
or detrimental to adjacent properties. It recognized the principle
that any regulation or restriction upon the use of property which
bears no relation to public safety, health, morals or general wel-
fare, cannot be sustained as a proper exercise of the police power
of the municipality. The Court found the surrounding area to be
commercial in nature and concluded that the Board's action was
arbitrary and directed issuance of the permit.
AGENCY, CONTRACTS, CORPORATIONS AND
PARTNERSHIPS
By ERVIN T. LARSON of the OrdwaL Bar
AGENCY
(1) Gray v. Blake, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.
Action by real estate broker Gray against the defendant Blake
for commission in obtaining a purchaser for certain real estate.
Trial by jury was in favor of defendant and plaintiff sued out
writ of error. Blake and his wife were owners in joint tenancy
of ranch property. Blake alone listed the property with Gray in
1949 and again in 1950. In March, 1951, Gray obtained a prospec-
tive buyer for the property upon terms which were approved by
Blake. A down payment of $1,000 by the purchaser was made
by check but the check was never cashed. Abstracts were furnished
and examined, after which the purchaser tendered the balance of
the purchase price in cash and demanded a deed signed by both
Mr. and Mrs. Blake. Mrs. Blake refused to sign, the deal fell
through and Gray sued for his commission.
Held: That if the broker Gray knew in advance that Mrs.
Blake would not join in the conveyance the broker could not re-
cover a commission. The opinion also indicates that if the broker
knew of the existence of the joint tenancy at the time of the listing,
it would be incumbent upon him to obtain the wife's consent to the
listing as well as the husband's. The case was reversed for failure
of the trial court to instruct properly and the cause was remanded
for further proceedings.
(2) Dumont v. Teets as Director of Employment Security,
1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.
Plaintiff, Dumont Sales Company, a partnership, brought
action against Bernard E. Teets as Director of the State Depart-
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